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MAXIMIZING THE BENEFITS OF THE INTER REVIEW CONFERENCE 
PROCESS: 
 
I: NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 
 
by  Graham S. Pearson* and Nicholas A Sims†  
 
Introduction 
 
1.  At the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) it was agreed1: 
 
 To hold three annual meetings of the States Parties of one week duration each year 
commencing in 2003 until the Sixth Review Conference, to be held not later than the 
end of 2006, to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action 
on: 
 
i.  The adoption of necessary, national measures to implement the prohibitions 
set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; 
 
ii.  National mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight 
of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; 
 
iii.  Enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
iv.  Strengthening and broadening national and international institutional 
efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and 
combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants; 
 
v.  The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. 
[Emphasis added] 
 
and that "Each meeting of the States Parties will be prepared by a two week meeting of 
experts."   The past few months have seen Ambassador Tibor Tóth, the Chairman of the 
meetings to be held in 2003, carrying out consultations with States Parties in order to develop 
a schedule of work for the Meeting of Experts on 18 to 29 August 2003.  These consultations 
have led initially to the identification and circulation of subtopics for the two topics to be 
considered in 2003 and agreement that the first topic "The adoption of necessary, national 
measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment 
of penal legislation;" will be considered during the first week, 18 to 22 August, and that the 
                                                 
* Graham S. Pearson is a Visiting Professor of International Security in the Department of Peace Studies at the 
University of Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire BD7  1DP, UK. 
† Nicholas A. Sims is a Reader in International Relations in the Department of International Relations at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, Houghton Street, London  WC2A  
2AE, UK. 
1United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November - 7 December 2001 and 11 - 22 November 2002, Final Document, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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second topic "National mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of 
pathogenic microorganisms and toxins;" will be considered in the second week, 25 to 29 
August 2003.   More recently, a more detailed structure has been circulated which lists 
elements for each of the subtopics. 
 
2.  These annual meetings of the States Parties preceded by two week Meetings of Experts 
need to be clearly seen to be what they are -- an inter Review Conference process.  
Consequently, they need to build upon the extended understandings developed by earlier 
Review Conferences and in their promotion of common understandings and effective action 
they need to be aimed towards the Sixth Review Conference. 
 
3.  The programme of follow-up work in this new format needs to contribute to the recovery 
of the cumulative Review Conference process, and to strengthen it as the mainstream of 
BTWC diplomacy.  This goal requires constructive use to be made of the agreed language in 
past Final Declarations, while taking it forward in terms of common understandings and 
effective action through the addition of shared best practice. 
 
4.  The planning for the experts meetings in Geneva in August 2003 has seen the structuring 
of the limited time available for the two topics into increasingly detailed elements.  Although 
this is helpful to States Parties in preparing for the experts meeting as it enables them to be 
prepared to address the relevant topics on the assigned day, it is essential that the States 
Parties do provide material to the Chairman and the Secretariat preferably prior to the 
assigned day and at the very latest before the end of the experts meeting as without inputs 
from the States Parties it will not be possible for the Chairman and Secretariat to develop 
observations or findings which will effectively promote common understandings and result in 
effective action. 
 
5. This Briefing Paper addresses the first topic to be addressed in 2003, namely "The 
adoption of necessary, national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the 
Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation;" by building upon the information 
provided in the earlier Briefing Papers No. 22 and No. 33 to provide a background based on 
the extended understandings agreed at previous Review Conferences and then using the 
structure developed for the experts meeting setting out our appreciation of the common 
understandings and possible effective action in the context of the forthcoming Sixth Review 
Conference.  
 
Preparations for the Meeting of Experts in August 2003 
 
6.   Ambassador Tibor Tóth as Chairman of the meetings to be held in Geneva in 2003 has 
following consultations with the States Parties identified five subtopics for each of the two 
topics to be considered in 2003.  These subtopics have been identified with the aim of 
focussing the discussions and not of restricting them.   They are also intended to help States 
Parties plan the involvement of their national experts so as to have the right experts there at 
the right time. 
                                                 
2Nicholas A. Sims, The New  Multilateral Process For The BTWC: Ambiguities And Opportunities, University 
of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No.2 (Second Series), January 2003, paragraph 19.  
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
3Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, National Measures to Implement the Prohibitions in the BTWC, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No.3 (Second Series), March 2003.  
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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7.  The five thematic subtopics for topic i.  The adoption of necessary, national measures to 
implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal 
legislation; which would be addressed on successive days during the first week, 18 to 22 
August, of the Meeting of Experts are: 
 
a.  Legal, Regulatory and Administrative  
 
• Various approaches for implementing the prohibitions in the Convention 
such as legislation, regulation, administrative measures, or a combination of 
these. 
 
b.  Prohibitions 
 
• National measures used to implement the prohibitions in the Convention 
• Measures to prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, 
retention or use of biological weapons such as anti-terrorism or war crimes 
legislation, or legislation which directly implements the Convention. 
 
c.  Control 
 
• Measures implemented to control the movement of microbial or other 
biological agents or toxins, or equipment which could be utilized in the 
production of biological weapons. 
• Examples could include import/export control legislation or transport and 
packaging regulations. 
 
d.  Practical Implementation 
 
• The "nuts and bolts" of how to carry out the various measures "on the 
ground" 
• Examples include regulations and procedures followed by customs officials, 
border control, law enforcement officials, and those responsible for import or 
export controls as they operationalize the prohibitions in the Convention. 
 
e.  Criminalization and Law Enforcement. 
 
• Penal legislation and other measures to criminalize the prohibitions within 
the Convention. 
• Law enforcement given its role in the prevention of and response to crimes. 
 
8.  States Parties have been encouraged into providing input papers in advance of the 
meeting which would either provide an overview of national approaches to implementing the 
prohibitions in the Convention or papers approaching the issue from a thematic perspective 
grounded in national experience.   In addition, States Parties are being encouraged to make 
presentations that detail their experience from a thematic perspective, preferably tailored to 
the subtopics outlined above. 
 
9.  More recently, a more detailed structure has been provided for each thematic subtopic 
dividing it, for four of the five subtopics, into four further subdivisions each containing a 
number of elements.   This detailed structure is as follows: 
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Day One –18 August 
 
Day Two-19 August 
 
Day Three-20 August Day Four-21 August Day Five-22 August 
Legal, Regulatory & 
Administrative 
Prohibitions Restrictions Practical Implementation & 
Enforcement 
 
Criminalization & Law 
Enforcement 
A) CIVIL 
• Types of Legal 
Systems: Models & 
Options 
• Technical Assistance 
• Definitions 
 
A) DIRECT 
IMPLEMENTATION 
• Definitions in legislation 
• General Purpose Criterion 
• Models & Options 
A) CLASSIFICATION 
• Lists 
• Dual-Use Items 
• Models 
• Catch-all Clauses 
 
 
A) NATIONAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
• Bureaucratic Structures 
• Division of 
Responsibilities and 
Authority 
• Domestic Inter-Agency 
Cooperation 
A) INFORMATION 
SHARING 
• Early Warning 
Indicators (of hostile 
intent/illicit 
activities) 
• Protected disclosure 
B) PENAL 
• Penal Codes 
• Penal Provisions 
• Penalties 
• Models & Options 
B) WAR MATERIALS 
• Classification 
• WMD Legislation 
• Existing Legislation 
 
B) OPERATIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
• Permits 
• Licensing 
• Registration 
• Customs 
• Handling 
B) INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION 
• Inter-IGO Cooperation 
• Government-IGO 
Cooperation 
• Regional Arrangements 
• Assistance 
B) ENFORCEMENT 
• Inter-Agency 
Coordination 
• Science and Security 
• Evidence-collection 
C) REGULATIONS 
• Origins/Sources 
(National, Regional, 
IGO) 
• Legal Standing 
• Models & Options 
 
C) DEVELOPMENT, 
PRODUCTION, 
POSSESSION & USE 
• Development 
• Production 
• Possession 
• Use 
C) INTANGIBLE 
TECHNOLOGIES 
• Dual-Use Knowledge 
• Technical Assistance 
• Personnel Security 
• Education 
• Trade Issues 
C) EDUCATION & 
TRAINING 
• Awareness raising  
• Norm promotion 
• Training of agency staff 
• Science and Security 
• Military training 
 
 
C) INTERNATIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
• Extradition 
• Agreements 
 
 
D) GUIDELINES 
• Origins/Sources  
• Legal Standing 
• Models & Options 
 
D) COMPLEMENTARY 
LEGISLATION 
• Anti-terrorism legislation 
• Public health security 
• Anti-conspiracy legislation 
• Hazardous materials 
• BW legislation 
D) SANCTIONS 
• Bilateral 
• Multilateral 
• Arms Embargoes 
 
D) EXPERTS 
• Identification of national 
experts 
• Establishment of advisory 
boards 
 
 
7 
 
10.  This further elaboration into a detailed structure is valuable in that it should help to 
ensure that all relevant aspects relating to the necessary, national measures to implement the 
prohibitions are addressed by the Meeting of Experts.  It has, however, to be recognized that 
time is very limited and the outcome of the Meeting of Experts needs to be focussed on 
promoting common understanding and effective action as required in the mandate agreed by 
the Fifth Review Conference4.   Furthermore, it will be recalled that the mandate states that: 
 
(b) All meetings, both of experts and of States Parties, will reach any conclusions or 
results by consensus. 
 
and that 
 
(d)  The meetings of experts will prepare factual reports describing their work. 
 
11.  Consequently, attention needs to be given prior to the Meeting of Experts to how the 
common understandings will be promoted and effective action taken.  It can be expected that 
the inputs made by States Parties, particularly in the input papers providing an overview of 
national approaches, will demonstrate that there are common approaches being taken in many 
States Parties as well as in several regions which could be identified as common 
understandings in regard to both national measures and their implementation.  The 
presentations of thematic perspectives should enable those approaches which represent best 
practice to be identified -- and, consequently, for effective action to be identified in which 
States Parties review their national measures against these common understandings and best 
practice and thus improve their national measures and national implementation. 
 
12.  All of this has to be seen against the background of the Review Conferences as these 
annual meetings are all part of the Inter Review Conference process agreed at the Fifth 
Review Conference.  After all, the mandate states clearly that: 
 
(e) The Sixth Review Conference will consider the work of these meetings and decide 
on further work.  
 
It would therefore be prudent to ensure that the outcome of the annual meetings will indeed 
contribute to the recovery of the cumulative Review Conference process, and strengthen it as 
the mainstream of BTWC diplomacy.  This ultimate goal of strengthening the mainstream of 
BTWC diplomacy requires constructive use to be made of the agreed language in past Final 
Declarations, while taking it forward in terms of common understandings and effective action 
through the addition of shared best practice.  It is recognized that the common understandings 
and effective action emerging from the Meeting of Experts are essentially drafts for the First 
Meeting of the States Parties to be held in November 2003 and consequently the language 
proposed in this Briefing Paper for the common understandings and effective action is framed 
in terms of language that might be adopted by the First Meeting. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November - 7 December 2001 and 11 - 22 November 2002, Final Document, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
 
8 
The Meeting of Experts in August 2003 
 
13.   Consideration can be given to the common understandings that are likely to emerge from 
the Meeting of Experts and thus to the elements of best practice that might be built upon in 
identifying effective action.  This is done by considering the five thematic subtopics in turn. 
 
A.  Legal, Regulatory and Administrative Systems.  
 
14.   Legal Systems.  It can be expected that there will be ready recognition of and common 
understanding that there is a wide diversity in legal systems, and hence of constitutional 
processes, among States Parties; and that, as required by Article IV of the Convention, it is 
for each State Party to the Convention in accordance with its constitutional processes to take 
any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the activities involving biological weapons 
which are defined in Article I.  By definition these necessary measures are national measures 
although international measures may also be needed to complete the criminalization of the 
forbidden activities, as recommended in a later section of this Briefing Paper.  By definition, 
too, the measures taken must do more than merely prohibit the forbidden activities;  they 
must also prevent them.  This prevention requirement sets a high standard of effectiveness.  
It is indeed a very stringent criterion to attach to national implementing measures, but it is 
explicitly included in Article IV of the Convention and thus constitutes one of the obligations 
flowing from the Convention.   It can usefully be regarded as a test of the effectiveness of 
legislation and other measures of a prohibitory nature in each State Party.  If a State Party's 
legislative and other prohibitions are not strong enough to prevent the activities involving 
biological weapons which are defined in Article I of the Convention, they do not meet the 
high standard set by Article IV and that State Party accordingly risks falling short of full 
compliance with its international obligations under the Convention.  It would be desirable for 
the Meeting of Experts to express this as a common understanding of the significance of the 
prevention criterion set by Article IV and to recommend that States Parties take effective 
action by reviewing the effectiveness of their national measures to implement the prohibitions 
of the Convention in meeting the prevention criterion. 
 
15.  Insofar as technical assistance is concerned, it can be expected that a common 
understanding will be developed from the language that was agreed at the Fourth Review 
Conference5:  
 
... some States Parties, as requested by the Second Review Conference, have provided 
to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs information on the texts of 
specific legislation enacted or other measures taken to assure domestic compliance 
with the Convention. These States Parties are invited, and all States Parties are 
encouraged, to provide such information and texts in the future. In this regard the  
information provided by States Parties in response to the confidence-building 
measure agreed to at the Third Review Conference entitled "Declaration of 
legislation, regulations and other measures" is welcomed. In addition, all States 
Parties are encouraged to provide any useful information on the implementation of 
such measures. 
 
                                                 
5United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Document, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996, Part II. p. 
18.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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16.  In addition, it should be recognised that, as agreed at the Third Review Conference, from 
15 April 1992 States Parties, under Confidence-Building Measure E, 
 
 shall be prepared to submit copies of the legislation or regulations or written details 
of other measures on request to the United Nations Department for Disarmament 
Affairs or to an individual State Party.6 [Emphasis added] 
 
Each State Party can now, therefore, request these details bilaterally under the authority of 
the Third Review Conference, instead of depending solely upon the circulation of texts made 
available to the United Nations.  Although this extension to provide for bilateral requests has 
not been recorded explicitly in any Final Declaration, it is still one part of the politically 
binding requirement of CBM 'E'.  It therefore represents one of the common understandings 
which have evolved out of Article IV.  This bilateral approach should become more important 
as States Parties take a greater interest in the status and effectiveness of their own legislation 
as well as other States Parties' legislation, and whether it is sufficiently strong and 
comprehensive to contribute to security overall.  They can check one another's legislative 
performance individually, and make their own assessment of its adequacy.   The possibility of 
requesting these details bilaterally could be used to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on any 
State Party which was thought, by reason of the inadequacy of its national measures, to be 
leaving open loopholes which bioterrorists or others might exploit to the detriment of 
everyone's security.  To "be prepared to submit copies of the legislation or regulations or 
written details of other measures on request" is to accept that these texts are of legitimate 
interest to individual States Parties and that their requests are in accord with the common 
understanding of what Article IV implies for each State Party. 
 
17.  It can also be expected that the Meeting of Experts will recognise the importance of 
cooperation and initiatives which was agreed by the Fourth  and earlier Review Conferences 
in the paragraph7 stating that "The Conference encourages cooperation and initiatives, 
including regional ones, towards the strengthening and implementation of the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention regime."   It can further be expected that the Meeting of Experts 
will recognise the parallel from the Chemical Weapons Convention8 where the second 
paragraph of Article VII National Implementation Measures states that: 
 
2.  Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the 
appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the 
obligations in paragraph 1. 
 
by developing a common understanding along the lines of: 
 
                                                 
6United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 9–27 September 1991, Final Document, BWC/CONF.III/23/Part II, 1992, pp.12-13. 
Available at http://www.opbw.org 
7United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Document, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996, Part II. p. 
18.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
8United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Corrected version in accordance with Depositary Notification 
C.N.246.1994.Treaties-5 and the corresponding Proces-Verbal of Rectification of the Original of the 
Convention, issued on 8 April 1994.   Available at http://www.opcw.org/cwc/cwc-eng.htm 
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The First Meeting encouraged each State Party that is in a position to do so upon 
request to afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to other States Parties to 
facilitate the implementation of the obligations in Article IV of the Convention. 
 
18.  Definitions.  The definitions of what needs to be prohibited and prevented are specified 
in Article I and Article III of the Convention.   The Meeting of Experts in considering 
common understandings can be expected to start from the language in Article I that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to 
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:  
 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;  
 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  
 
and then to ensure that in any legislation and other national measures States Parties embrace 
also the extended understandings arrived at by the successive Review Conferences such as 
that of the Fourth Review Conference9 that: 
 
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as 
well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes.  
 
A proposal for effective action would be for States Parties to review their national measures 
and to confirm that they did indeed prohibit the activities defined in Article I and embraced 
the extended understandings. 
 
19.  Insofar as Article III is concerned, the Meeting of Experts in considering common 
understandings would start from the language of the Article that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce 
any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified 
in article I of this Convention.  
 
and again to ensure that national measures include the extended understandings arrived at by 
the successive Review Conferences such as that of the Fourth Review Conference10 that: 
                                                 
9United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Document, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996, Part II. p. 
15.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
10United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Document, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996, Part II. p. 
17.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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The Conference affirms that Article III is sufficiently comprehensive to cover any 
recipient whatsoever at international, national or subnational levels. 
 
A proposal for effective action would be for States Parties to review their national measures 
and to confirm that they did indeed implement the obligations of Article III and embraced the 
extended understandings. 
 
20.  Penal provisions are needed to ensure that the legislation and regulatory provisions can 
be enforced and to make it clear nationally that non-compliance will not be accepted.  The 
Meeting of Experts in considering common understandings can be expected to start from the 
language agreed by the Fourth Review Conference11 that: 
 
The Conference notes those measures already taken by a number of States Parties in 
this regard, for example the adoption of penal legislation, and reiterates its call to 
any State Party that has not yet taken any necessary measures to do so immediately, 
in accordance with its constitutional processes. 
 
Given the trend towards strengthening references to penal legislation in the Ad Hoc Group 
negotiations of 1997 -- 2001, and the much greater awareness of the dangers of terrorist 
attack, including the use of biological agents as in the attacks in the United States in which 
anthrax has been sent through the postal system, since the events of 11 September 2001, it 
can be expected that the Meeting of Experts could recognise a stronger common 
understanding of the necessity for all States Parties to adopt any necessary national measures, 
including penal legislation.  It should be possible to agree the inclusion of penal legislation, 
without seeking to constrain States Parties' discretion in how they choose to enact penal 
legislation in accordance with their respective legal systems and traditions.  Consequently, a 
stronger common understanding could develop from the language agreed by the Fourth 
Review Conference if it were adapted to read: 
 
 The First Meeting noted that a number of States Parties have already taken measures 
to implement Article IV of the Convention, including the adoption of penal 
legislation, and any State Party that has not yet taken any necessary measures is urged 
to do to do so immediately, in accordance with its constitutional processes. 
 
21.  Regulations are in many countries complementary to legislation.  Principles are 
frequently set out in legislation and the detailed requirements are set out in regulations.   In 
many national systems, the detailed regulations can be amended so as to keep them up to date 
by administrative action without the necessity of having to find parliamentary time in order to 
enact modified legislation.  The regulations do, however, carry the full force of law and are 
enforced through the national authorities bringing cases in the civil and criminal courts.   In 
some regions, such as that of the European Community, legally binding directives are issued 
which apply throughout the Community and are generally enacted nationally by national 
regulations. 
 
                                                 
11United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Document, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996, Part II. p. 
17.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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22.  Guidelines.  Although these can appear at first sight to be voluntary, and some may state 
that they are advisory, guidelines are frequently given teeth through it being made clear that 
the requirements set out in regulations are to be achieved by following the guidelines -- and 
that if an individual, an institution or a company chooses not to follow the guidelines then 
they are expected to follow a closely comparable approach that can be demonstrated to be at 
least as effective as those in the guidelines. 
 
B.  Prohibitions 
 
23.  Direct Implementation.  The Meeting of Experts can be expected to identify a common 
understanding that because Article IV of the Convention requires that:    
  
 Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, 
production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the 
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. 
 
this obliges each State Party to ensure national implementation in the broadest possible terms, 
as the scope clauses at the end of the Article spell out clearly.   Although the word legislation 
does not appear in this Article, the commonest response to this obligation among those States 
Parties which have made known their response has been either to legislate in such a way as to 
give domestic legal effect to the prohibitions contained in Article I, or to determine on 
examination of their existing laws that no further specific legislation is necessary. In recent 
years a growing concern about bioterrorism has reinforced the case for enacting specific 
legislation, and also for strengthening such legislation as already exists.  It has also given 
governments a greater sense of urgency, as it has come to be recognised that legislation to 
give domestic legal effect to BTWC prohibitions is a vital element in their efforts to counter 
terrorist threats. National implementation also embraces government decrees, regulations and 
administrative memoranda to law enforcement agencies, although relatively little is known as 
to what action many States Parties have taken in this respect.  It is understandable, therefore, 
that national implementation has come to be identified closely with the adoption of new 
legislation. 
 
24.    Such legislation ties the Convention into national legal systems in the clearest possible 
way.  It contributes to the strengthening of compliance by expanding the constituency with an 
institutional interest in the success of the Convention.  It also builds the treaty regime flowing 
from the Convention into normative structures at the national level, in the form of rules and 
expectations and procedures for upholding them.  These rules, expectations and procedures in 
turn uphold their counterparts at the international level.  They shore up the international treaty 
regime and help, even if only marginally, to ensure its survival by constituting one more 
obstacle which would have to be overcome if the Convention were to come under attack. 
 
25.  The language which is used nationally in such direct legislation should follow closely 
that which is within the Convention in order to ensure that no loopholes are inadvertently 
created through the language being used nationally in legislation differing from that in 
obligations undertaken by the State Party under the Convention.   The Meeting of Experts 
could be expected to reach a common understanding in which it is recommended that States 
Parties in enacting national measures to implement the Convention use the same language as 
that in  Articles I and III of the Convention which set out the prohibitions.    
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26.  This is particularly important in regard to the General Purpose Criterion highlighted in 
bold below in Article I: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to 
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:  
 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;  
 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  
 
It is the language of the General Purpose Criterion which ensures that the prohibitions of the 
Convention are all embracing and include both past and future biological agents.   It is 
consequently vital that implementing legislation in regard to both Article I and to Article III 
uses comparable language to ensure that the prohibitions implemented nationally are also all 
embracing. 
 
27.  The Meeting of Experts can also be expected to reach a common understanding that the 
need for national legislation implementing the prohibitions of the Convention may also be 
covered to a limited extent in some States Parties by national legislation implementing the 
Chemical Weapons Convention as weapons containing toxin agents are prohibited under both 
Conventions.  An effective action could be to require States Parties to review their national 
implementing legislation for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and for the 
Chemical Weapons Convention to ensure that the prohibitions in respect of toxins are both all 
embracing and consistent. 
 
28.  War Materials.  In some States Parties legislation to implement the BTWC may be 
incorporated in broader war materials legislation.  In such cases, it is important to ensure that 
the prohibitions are applicable at all times and are not limited to war time as the prohibition 
in Article I relates to the use of biological weapons for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  
The national legislation needs to implement the General Purpose Criterion effectively at all 
times as the obligation in Article IV of the Convention is to prohibit and prevent.  
 
29.  Development, Production, Possession and Use.   National legislation needs to embrace 
the prohibition of development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and use of biological 
weapons.   The prohibition needs to apply to both biological agents and toxins and to delivery 
means and, as already noted, needs to be consistent with the obligations undertaken by States 
Parties under the Convention.   There is much to be said for using identical or closely similar 
language in the national legislation to that in the Convention -- and for that reason, it is 
preferable to use the language develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain 
rather than introduce terms such as "possession" which do not appear in Article I or III of the 
Convention. 
 
30.  The Meeting of Experts could be expected to identify a common understanding that: 
 
The First Meeting emphasized that national implementing legislation needs to include 
prohibition of development, production, stockpiling, retention, acquisition and use of 
biological weapons with language that applies to both biological and toxin agents and 
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to the weapons, equipment and means of delivery.  Care should be taken to use 
language in the national legislation that is identical to or closely similar to that in the 
Convention so as to avoid any loopholes. 
 
31.  Complementary Legislation.  The national legislation implementing the prohibitions of 
the Convention can also be complemented by other national legislation addressing anti-
terrorism, public, animal and plant health, hazardous materials and anti-conspiracy 
legislation.   It is important to review such national legislation and its requirements to ensure 
that they are indeed complementary and that there are no inconsistencies.  Equally important 
is to ensure that implementation and enforcement is consistent as different agencies and 
authorities may be responsible for the enforcement of different legislation -- thus anti-
terrorism legislation is likely to be implemented and enforced by law enforcement agencies, 
public, animal or plant health legislation may be enforced by Ministry of Health and Ministry 
of Agriculture agencies, hazardous material legislation by Health & Safety agencies and so 
on.   There is much to be said for the creation of oversight committees which bring together 
all the different implementing and enforcement agencies and those who are affected by the 
legislation in government, industry and academia in order to review the consistency and 
continuing adequacy of the current legislation and regulations. 
 
32.  The Meeting of Experts could be expected to identify the common understanding that 
national legislation implementing the obligations of the Convention is likely to be 
complemented by other national legislation addressing topics such as anti-terrorism, public, 
animal and plant health, and hazardous materials.   An effective action could be to encourage 
States Parties to establish oversight committees involving all the different implementing and 
enforcement agencies together with those who are affected by the legislation in government, 
industry and academia in order to review the consistency and continuing adequacy of the 
current legislation and regulations. 
 
33.  Other Aspects.  There are important elements relating to prohibitions that are not 
explicitly included in the detailed structure. These relate to the applicability of the 
prohibitions and whether they are  applicable to all natural persons and whether they apply to 
activities carried out outside the territory of the State Party.   
 
C. Restrictions 
 
34.  It is noted that the term "Restrictions" has been used in the latest structure instead of the 
term "Controls" used in the earlier structure.   This change is regretted as "Controls" are more 
appropriate in dealing with biological and toxin agents which are intrinsically dual use as they 
occur in nature and yet need to be handled under controlled circumstances in government, 
industry and academia for human, animal and plant health reasons.    It is also evident that 
countries around the world require controls to be placed on the import of human, animal and 
plant pathogens and there is a logic in applying similar controls to transfers within countries.  
The term "restrictions" presents a needlessly negative perception which can alienate at the 
outset those who are required to implement the national controls.  In this Briefing Paper the 
term "controls" is used as it more accurately reflects the thematic subtopic being considered. 
 
35.  Classification.   In considering the controls on transfers, both nationally and 
internationally, of biological agents and toxins and of biological equipment, the controls 
generally reflect the risk classification of the biological agents.  However, it needs to be 
recognised that in many States Parties the national classification systems are different for 
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human, animal and plant pathogens and can well be tighter for plant pathogens than for 
human pathogens.  Insofar as common understandings are concerned, it is probably enough to 
recognise that individual States Parties will identify the biological agents and toxins of 
concern from the point of view of transfers both nationally and internationally -- and may 
choose to use the same list of agents for control of transfers nationally and internationally. It 
needs, additionally, to be recalled that the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference 
in the section on Article III stated that The Conference affirms that Article III is sufficiently 
comprehensive to cover any recipient whatsoever at international, national or subnational 
levels making it clear that controls are required both internationally and nationally.  
 
36.  Insofar as transfers of biological equipment are concerned, there are rarely controls on 
transfers nationally.  Controls are more usually applied to international transfers in order to 
implement the obligations of Article III of the BTWC. Biological equipment is not usually 
classified into categories.   
 
37.  Catch-all clauses are frequently utilized in export controls so as to avoid the problems 
associated with lists in that lists are intrinsically finite and can never be fully comprehensive.  
Typically, such catch-all clauses require an authorisation for the goods to be exported if the 
exporter has been informed by the national authorities that the items in question are or may be 
intended in their entirety or in part for use in weapons of mass destruction programmes or if 
the exporter is aware that the goods that he intends to export are for use in such programmes.  
The catch-all clause may apply to dual use goods or it may be wider and apply also to goods 
other than dual use goods.  
 
38.  Operational Framework.  States Parties will appoint national authorities to administer  
and enforce the national controls relating to transfers nationally and internationally.   These 
may be different authorities for national transfers of human, animal and plant pathogens and 
toxins and may be different again when it relates to the import or the export of such materials 
and of biological equipment.  As noted earlier, there is benefit in such authorities meeting at 
intervals to ensure that the regulations are consistent and that there are no loopholes -- or 
perceived loopholes -- between the different controls.  Enforcement also needs to be 
consistent nationally so that the regulations are upheld and observed.  Unenforced regulations 
are a danger to national security and safety. 
 
39.  Intangible Technologies.  This relates to the national implementation of obligations 
under Article III of the Convention.   As already noted, export controls need to embrace both 
dual-use equipment and of certain dual-use technology and in particular the technology 
required for the development, production or use of listed items. A licensing requirement on 
both physical and electronic transfers of information will frequently be required which should 
include an "end-use" control which applies to any dual-use items or indeed to any items 
where the exporter is informed by the government of the State Party that the items are or may 
be intended for use in connection with a weapons of mass destruction -- from the point of 
view of the Meeting of Experts this can be limited to a biological and toxin weapons -- or 
related missile programme.  Such an end-use control should apply to both physical and 
electronic transfers of technology -- ie intangible technologies -- as well as to exports of 
goods.   There should be no exemptions for information in the public domain or for basic 
scientific research with respect to the end-use control since it should be recognised that  
deliberately to send to a suspect recipient even a published book or article which might be of 
use to that biological and toxin weapons programme should require a licence.  
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40.  National regulations also need to embrace the provision of assistance by any nationals of 
the State Party no matter where such assistance is provided.   It needs to be borne in mind 
throughout that the obligation in Article III is clear that "Each State Party to this Convention 
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any 
way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations 
to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means 
of delivery specified in article I of this Convention." 
 
41.  Sanctions.   This would be better replaced by "Penal Provisions" as "Controls" apply 
both to national and international transfers.  There need to be penal provisions in national 
regulations to deal with failure to comply with national controls on the transfer, both 
nationally and internationally, of human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins.  Sanctions 
are primarily limited to action being taken by one State or a group of States against another 
State and are thus of less direct relevance to the national implementation of measures to 
implement the obligations under the Convention. 
 
D.  Practical Implementation and Enforcement. 
 
42.  National Infrastructure.  The bureaucratic structures and division of responsibilities 
will vary from State Party to State Party.   There can be no standard model that applies to all 
States Parties.  Rather, it needs to be recognised that the bureaucratic structures and 
responsibilities may well be different for human, animal and plant pathogens and for toxins.   
It is therefore important that the national infrastructure is reviewed periodically to ensure that 
the obligations under the Convention are being both comprehensively and consistently 
implemented and enforced by the different elements of government responsible for the 
different categories of biological agents and toxins.  There can be merit in holding at least an 
annual meeting of all the agencies involved to review national regulations and their 
implementation and enforcement to ensure that there are no loopholes or perceived loopholes. 
 
43.  International Cooperation.   As already noted, the Meeting of Experts could be 
expected, in the context of legal assistance, to recognise the parallel from the Chemical 
Weapons Convention12 where the second paragraph of Article VII National Implementation 
Measures states that: 
 
2.  Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the 
appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the 
obligations in paragraph 1. 
 
by developing a common understanding along the lines of: 
 
The First Meeting urged that each State Party that is in a position to do so should  
upon request afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to other States Parties to 
facilitate the implementation of the obligations in Article IV of the Convention. 
 
States Parties should be encouraged to cooperate together in the drawing up, implementation 
and enforcement of the obligations under the Convention. 
                                                 
12United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Corrected version in accordance with Depositary Notification 
C.N.246.1994.Treaties-5 and the corresponding Proces-Verbal of Rectification of the Original of the 
Convention, issued on 8 April 1994.   Available at http://www.opcw.org/cwc/cwc-eng.htm 
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44.  The role of Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO) is less clear.   First of all, there are a 
wide range of IGOs ranging from the WHO, FAO and OIE to other IGOs such as the ICGEB 
and to regional ones such as those within the European Community.  Insofar as some of these 
IGOs are concerned with human, animal and plant pathogens and with toxins, there is indeed 
a relevance to the interests of the States Parties to the BTWC.  However, it needs to be 
recognised that the aims and objectives of the IGOs can be quite different from those related 
to the implementation of the BTWC.   Particular care needs to be taken when considering 
"standards" promulgated by the IGOs as these may actually be "guidelines" to which member 
States aspire and may or may not be enforceable.   It also needs to be recognised that terms 
such as "biosafety" or "biosecurity" may have quite different meanings when used by an IGO.  
For effective use of the limited time available for the Meeting of Experts, it will be important 
to avoid sidetracks and confusion resulting from the different meanings of some of the terms 
used in the discussions.  It is clear that there are different meanings and understandings for 
the following terms: 
 
a.  Biosafety.   This is frequently used to mean the policies, practices and equipment to 
prevent biological agents harming humans, animal or plants or the environment.  
However, with the advent of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the term biosafety 
is sometimes used to refer to the procedures relating to living modified organisms. 
 
b.  Biosecurity.  It was pointed out that in some languages, such as French, the same 
word is used for biosafety and biosecurity.  The term biosecurity also has a 
particularly wide meaning in respect of FAO activities. 
 
c.  Deliberate release.  In the BTWC arena, this term is usually used to relate to a 
deliberate release by terrorists or by State Action.  There is another meaning -- a 
planned deliberate release -- in the context of the European wide directives relating to 
the deliberate release of genetically modified organisms or microorganisms. 
 
There could be benefit in a common understanding being agreed prior to the start of the 
Meeting of Experts in August as to what the terms "biosafety", "biosecurity" and "deliberate 
release" will mean during the Meeting.  Alternatively, each State Party should be asked to 
make it clear what is meant by the terms in their papers or presentations. 
 
45.  Regional arrangements are, however, much more relevant as regional efforts -- such as 
those of the Andean Federation, ASEAN and the European Union and its associated States -- 
which address security aspects can contribute an important element to the implementation 
nationally and regionally of the Convention.  There is much to be said for regional 
comparative tabulations that demonstrate the extent to which the Convention is being 
implemented in the region -- and peer pressure from fellow States in the region can be a 
powerful tool in encouraging and assisting laggards to remedy deficiencies. 
 
46.  Education and Training.  There is no doubt that successful implementation nationally 
of the Convention requires awareness raising in all States Parties of the prohibitions in the 
Convention and of the national implementation thereof. Although the States Parties at 
successive Review Conferences have agreed Final Declarations stating that: 
 
3. The Conference notes the importance of: 
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- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed to enhance domestic 
compliance with the Convention; 
 
- Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to 
prevent unauthorized access to and removal of microbial or other biological 
agents, or toxins:  
 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military education 
programmes of information dealing with the prohibitions and provisions 
contained in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925. 
  
there has been little attention given to the extent to which States Parties have actually taken 
such steps.    
 
47.  The Meeting of Experts is encouraged to recognise a common understanding along the 
lines of: 
 
The First Meeting recognized that effective national implementation of the 
prohibitions of the Convention requires the mounting of an effective and continuing 
campaign to ensure that all those working with biological agents and toxins both now 
and in the future are aware of the prohibitions of the Convention and of the national 
legislative, administrative and other measures to implement these prohibitions. 
 
48.  Experts.  Effective national implementation requires that the national measures to 
achieve this are practical and enforceable.  A balance needs to be struck to ensure that the 
burden associated with the implementation of national measures is appropriate.   In many 
States Parties, the effectiveness of national measures is enhanced by carrying out consultation 
with national experts both at the drafting stage when new legislation or regulations may be 
opened for consultation and may benefit from the provision of comments and proposals for 
amendment and during their implementation through advisory committees made up of 
appropriate national experts who can advise the national implementing authority on solutions 
to any problems that may arise during implementation or as a result of changing 
circumstances. 
 
49.  The Meeting of Experts is encouraged to recognise a common understanding along the 
lines of: 
 
The First Meeting noted that the effectiveness of drawing up national measures to 
implement the prohibitions of the Convention can be enhanced through making draft 
national measures available for consultation by seeking proposals for amendment 
from the public in general and the community that will be affected by and implement 
the measures in particular.  Advisory committees including representatives of the 
community that are affected by the measures can enhance the implementation of the 
national measures. 
 
E.  Criminalization & Law Enforcement 
 
50.  Information Sharing.   It is evident that national implementation can be made more 
effective if arrangements are made nationally to ensure that any unusual activities or 
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indications are shared with the appropriate national authorities on a timely basis so that action 
can be taken.  The ability to recognise such unusual activities and indications depends on the 
success of national programmes to ensure that those involved are aware of the prohibitions 
under the Convention and of the national measures to implement these prohibitions.   In 
several States Parties, representatives of several government authorities or agencies may visit 
facilities working with human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins for quite different 
purposes.  They need to be aware of the prohibitions and, should they observe any unusual 
activities or indications, they need to know to which authority they should report such 
observations. 
 
51.  Enforcement.  National measures to implement the prohibitions in the Convention need 
to be enforced and those who are not compliant prosecuted as measures that are not enforced 
are dangerous.  As already noted, as required by Article IV of the Convention, it is up to each 
State Party to the Convention in accordance with its constitutional processes to take any 
necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the activities involving biological weapons 
which are defined in Article I.  These necessary measures are national measures and the 
measures taken must do more than merely prohibit the forbidden activities;  they must also 
prevent them.  This prevention requirement sets a high standard of effectiveness.  It is indeed 
a very stringent criterion to attach to national implementing measures, but it is explicitly 
included in Article IV of the Convention and thus constitutes one of the obligations flowing 
from the Convention.   It can usefully be regarded as a test of the effectiveness of legislation 
and other measures of a prohibitory nature in each State Party.  If a State Party's legislative 
and other prohibitions are not strong enough to prevent the activities involving biological 
weapons which are defined in Article I of the Convention, they do not meet the high standard 
set by Article IV and that State Party accordingly risks falling short of full compliance with 
its international obligations under the Convention.  The Meeting of Experts can be 
encouraged to reach a common understanding that the national measures to implement the 
prohibitions of the Convention need to be enforced and to recommend as effective action that 
each State Party should review the effectiveness of its enforcement of the prohibitions. 
 
52.  International Arrangements.  In the context of criminalization, there is much to be said 
for taking forward the ideas developed by the Harvard-Sussex Program who have developed a 
draft Convention13 to prohibit biological and chemical weapons under international criminal 
law.   The proposed Convention would make it an offence for any person, regardless of 
official position, to order, direct, or knowingly to participate or render substantial assistance 
in the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of 
biological or chemical weapons or to threaten the use of such weapons or to create or retain 
facilities intended for the production of such weapons.  Any person who commits any of the 
prohibited acts anywhere would face the risk of apprehension, prosecution and punishment, 
or of extradition should that person be found in a state that supports the proposed 
Convention.   This proposed Convention would provide a valuable complement to the 
existing BTWC and CWC.  It could usefully be negotiated in the Sixth Committee of the 
United Nations General Assembly. 
 
                                                 
13The CBW Conventions Bulletin, A Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons Under 
International Criminal Law, Issue No 42, December 1998, pp. 1- 5. 
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53.  In addition,  there would be benefit in States Parties seeking the explicit addition of 
biological and toxin weapons to the existing Rome Statute14 of the International Criminal 
Court which, currently, under Article 8 War crimes includes: 
 
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons 
 
and reproduces the language of the first half of the prohibition in the 1925 Geneva Protocol: 
 
(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices 
 
but omits the "bacteriological methods of warfare" which constitutes the second half of the 
prohibition in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, or any language drawn from the BTWC.  The Rome 
Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002 and currently has some 91 member States.15  
 
54.  The Meeting of Experts is encouraged to recognise a common understanding along the 
lines of: 
 
The First Meeting encouraged the States Parties to explore the possibility of 
negotiating in an appropriate forum, or asking the Sixth Committee of the United 
Nations General Assembly to negotiate, an international convention on the 
criminalization of biological and chemical weapon activities which would emphasise 
individual criminal responsibility for acts stigmatized as international crimes.  In 
addition, the First Meeting encourages States Parties to seek the addition of biological 
and toxin weapons to the existing Rome Statute references to chemical weapons as 
falling within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.  The First Meeting  
favours such international legal approaches to the criminalization of all acts prohibited 
among States Parties as usefully supplementing national implementation measures 
under Article IV of the BTWC by ensuring that any jurisdictional loopholes are 
closed, and that immunity from prosecution for criminal acts involving biological and 
toxin weapons is thereby abolished. 
 
Outcome of the Meeting of Experts 
 
55.   The starting point for the common understandings and effective action that are to be the 
outcome of the Meeting of Experts and the subsequent Meeting of the States Parties in 
November 2003 needs to be the extended understandings that have been developed by the 
previous Review Conferences as the common understandings and effective action need to be 
aimed towards the Sixth Review Conference.  It must be borne in mind throughout that the 
annual meetings are an inter Review Conference process. 
 
56.  In this section, a summary is first provided showing the evolution of the extended 
common understandings regarding Article IV of the Convention, and then the various 
proposals for common understandings and effective action relating to the first topic "The 
adoption of necessary, national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the 
Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation;" are drawn together as a 
consolidated text. 
                                                 
14Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8 War crimes.  Available at http://www.un.org/ 
law/icc/ 
15Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Ratification Status.  Available at http://www.un.org/ law/icc/ 
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57.  Extended Common Understandings.  The evolution of common understandings regarding 
Article IV of the Convention was examined in Briefing Paper No. 316 and summarised there 
in tabular form.  For ease of reference, this tabular summation is reproduced here as it 
provides the starting point for considering language for the outcome of the Meeting of 
Experts and the subsequent States Parties meeting in November 2003. 
 
58.  In this summary in tabular form of the developments thus far of the regime for Article IV 
over the first four Review Conferences bold text is used to highlight the developments in 
successive Final Declarations.  First in regard to the fundamental requirement in Article IV: 
 
Article IV Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and 
prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or 
retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of 
such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. 
1st Review Conference The Conference notes the provisions of Article IV, which requires 
each State Party to take any necessary measure to prohibit and 
prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or 
retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within its territory, 
under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere, and calls upon 
all States Parties which have not yet taken any necessary measures 
in accordance with their constitutional processes to do so 
immediately. 
2nd Review 
Conference 
The Conference notes the importance of Article IV, under which each 
State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, 
take any necessary measures to prohibit or prevent any acts or 
actions which would contravene the Convention. 
 
The Conference calls upon all States Parties which have not yet taken 
any necessary measures in accordance with their constitutional 
processes, as required by the Article, to do so immediately. 
                                                 
16Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, National Measures to Implement the Prohibitions in the BTWC, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No.3 (Second Series), March 2003, 
paragraphs 7 to 22.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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3rd Review Conference The Conference notes the importance of Article IV, under which each 
State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take 
any necessary measures to prohibit or prevent any acts or actions 
which would contravene the Convention. 
 
The Conference notes those measures already taken by some States 
Parties in this regard, for example the adoption of penal legislation, 
and reiterates its call to any State Party that has not yet taken any 
necessary measures to do so immediately, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes. Such measures should apply within the 
territory of a State Party, under its jurisdiction or under its control 
anywhere. The Conference invites each State Party to consider, if 
constitutionally possible and in conformity with international law, 
the application of such measures to actions taken anywhere by 
natural persons possessing its nationality. 
4th Review Conference 1. The Conference underlines the importance of Article IV. It 
reaffirms the commitment of States Parties to take the necessary 
national measures under this Article, in accordance with their 
constitutional processes. These measures are to ensure the 
prohibition and prevention of the development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the 
Convention anywhere within their territory, under their jurisdiction 
or under their control, in order to prevent their use for purposes 
contrary to the Convention. The States Parties recognize the need to 
ensure, through the review and/or adoption of national measures, 
the effective fulfilment of their obligations under the Convention in 
order, inter alia, to exclude use of biological and toxin weapons in 
terrorist or criminal activity.  
 
2. The Conference notes those measures already taken by a number of 
States Parties in this regard, for example the adoption of penal 
legislation, and reiterates its call to any State Party that has not yet 
taken any necessary measures to do so immediately, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes. Such measures should apply within 
its territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The 
Conference invites each State Party to consider, if constitutionally 
possible and in conformity with international law, the application of 
such measures also to actions taken anywhere by natural persons 
possessing its nationality. 
 
59.  Secondly, in regard to the provision of texts of legislation and other regulatory measures 
for the purposes of consultation: 
 
1st Review Conference The Conference invites States Parties which have found it necessary 
to enact specific legislation or take other regulatory measures 
relevant to this Article to make available the appropriate texts to the 
United Nations Centre for Disarmament, for the purposes of 
consultation. 
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2nd Review 
Conference 
The Conference notes that States Parties, as requested by the First 
Review Conference, have provided to the United Nations 
Department for Disarmament Affairs information on and the texts 
of specific legislation enacted or other regulatory measures taken by 
them, relevant to this article. The Conference invites States Parties to 
continue to provide such information and texts to the United Nations 
Department for Disarmament Affairs for purposes of consultation. 
3rd Review Conference The Conference notes that some States Parties, as requested by the 
Second Review Conference, have provided to the United Nations 
Department for Disarmament Affairs information on and texts of 
specific legislation enacted or other measures taken to assure 
domestic compliance with the Convention. The Conference invites 
these States Parties, and encourages all States Parties, to provide 
such information and texts in the future. In this regard the 
Conference welcomes agreement by the States Parties participating 
in the Third Review Conference to implement a new confidence-
building measure entitled "Declaration of legislation, regulations 
and other measures". In addition, the Conference invites all States 
Parties to provide any useful information on the implementation of 
such measures. 
4th Review Conference 5. The Conference notes that some States Parties, as requested by the 
Second Review Conference, have provided to the United Nations 
Department for Disarmament Affairs information on the texts of 
specific legislation enacted or other measures taken to assure 
domestic compliance with the Convention. The Conference invites 
these States Parties, and encourages all States Parties, to provide 
such information and texts in the future. In this regard the Conference 
welcomes information provided by States Parties in response to the 
confidence-building measure agreed to at the Third Review 
Conference entitled "Declaration of legislation, regulations and other 
measures". In addition, the Conference encourages all States Parties 
to provide any useful information on the implementation of such 
measures. 
 
60.  Thirdly, in regard to the wider range of national implementation actions which were 
given international commendation first at the Second Review Conference: 
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2nd Review 
Conference 
The Conference notes the importance of 
 
- legislative, administrative and other measures 
designed effectively to guarantee compliance with the with the 
provisions of the Convention within the territory under the 
jurisdiction or control of a State Party; 
 
- legislation regarding the physical protection of 
laboratories and facilities to prevent unauthorised access to 
and removal of pathogenic or toxic material; and 
 
- inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and 
military educational programmes of information dealing with 
the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin 
weapons and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol 
 
and believes that such measures which States might undertake in 
accordance with their constitutional process would strengthen the 
effectiveness of the Convention.  
3rd Review Conference The Conference notes the importance of: 
 
- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed 
effectively to enhance domestic compliance with the 
Convention; 
 
- Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories 
and facilities to prevent unauthorized access to and removal 
of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins; 
 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military 
educational programmes of information dealing with the 
prohibition of microbial or other biological agents or toxins 
and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol. 
 
The Conference believes that such measures which States Parties 
might undertake in accordance with their constitutional processes 
would strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention. 
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4th Review Conference 3. The Conference notes the importance of: 
 
- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed to 
enhance domestic compliance with the Convention; 
 
- Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories 
and facilities to prevent unauthorized access to and removal 
of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins:  
 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military 
education programmes of information dealing with the 
prohibitions and provisions contained in the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 
1925. 
 
4. The Conference believes that such measures which States Parties 
might undertake in accordance with their constitutional processes 
would strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention, as requested by 
the Second and Third Review Conferences. 
 
61.  Finally, on cooperation and initiatives, including regional ones, which appeared first at 
the Third Review Conference: 
 
3rd Review Conference The Conference welcomes regional measures such as the Mendoza 
Declaration as well as other initiatives dealing with the renunciation 
of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons, as 
concrete positive steps towards the strengthening of the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention regime. 
4th Review Conference 6. The Conference encourages cooperation and initiatives, including 
regional ones, towards the strengthening and implementation of the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention regime. 
 
There was also a single paragraph on use which first appeared at the Fourth Review 
Conference: 
 
4th Review Conference 7. The Conference reaffirms that under all circumstances the use of 
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is effectively 
prohibited by the Convention. 
  
62.  Outcome of the Meeting of Experts. It is recognized that the common understandings and 
effective action emerging from the Meeting of Experts are essentially drafts for the First 
Meeting of the States Parties to be held in November 2003 and consequently the language 
proposed in this Briefing Paper for the common understandings and effective action is framed 
in terms of language that might be adopted by the First Meeting.  In the consolidated text 
provided below, cross references are provided in parentheses at the end of each paragraph to 
the relevant paragraph in this Briefing Paper. Insofar as the outcome of the Meeting of 
Experts in August 2003 and the subsequent Meeting of States Parties in November 2003 is 
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concerned, the starting point is the language agreed by the Fourth Review Conference17, 
modified so as to refer to the First Meeting instead of to the Conference and transposed into 
the past sentence since the outcome of the First Meeting is to be a report not a Final 
Declaration: 
 
OUTCOME OF THE FIRST MEETING: NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 
 
1. The First Meeting underlined the importance of Article IV. It reaffirmed the 
commitment of States Parties to take the necessary national measures under this 
Article, in accordance with their constitutional processes. These measures are to 
ensure the prohibition and prevention of the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery specified in Article I of the Convention anywhere within their territory, under 
their jurisdiction or under their control, in order to prevent their use for purposes 
contrary to the Convention. The States Parties recognized the need to ensure, through 
the review and/or adoption of national measures, the effective fulfilment of their 
obligations under the Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude use of biological and 
toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity.  (paras 12 and 58) 
 
2. The First Meeting noted those measures already taken by a number of States Parties 
in this regard, including the adoption of penal legislation, and urged any State Party 
that has not yet taken any necessary measures to do so immediately, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes. Such measures should apply within its territory, 
under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The Conference invited each State 
Party to consider, if constitutionally possible and in conformity with international law, 
the application of such measures also to actions taken anywhere by natural persons 
possessing its nationality. (paras 20, 33 and 58) 
 
3.  The First Meeting recognized that there is a wide diversity in legal systems, and 
hence of constitutional processes, among States Parties; and that, as required by 
Article IV of the Convention, it is for each State Party to the Convention in 
accordance with its constitutional processes to take any necessary measures to 
prohibit and prevent the activities involving biological weapons which are defined in 
Article I.  The First Meeting noted that the national measures to be taken by States 
Parties must do more than merely prohibit the forbidden activities;  they must also 
prevent them.  Furthermore, it was noted that if a State Party's legislative and other 
prohibitions are not strong enough to prevent the activities involving biological 
weapons which are defined in Article I of the Convention, they do not meet the high 
standard set by Article IV and that State Party accordingly risks falling short of full 
compliance with its international obligations under the Convention.  The First 
Meeting recommended that States Parties should take effective action by reviewing 
the effectiveness of their national measures to implement the prohibitions of the 
Convention in meeting the prevention criterion. (para 14) 
 
4.  The First Meeting encouraged each State Party that is in a position to do so upon 
request to afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to other States Parties to 
                                                 
17United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Document, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996, Part II. p. 
17-18.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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facilitate the implementation of the obligations in Article IV of the Convention. (para 
17) 
 
5.  The First Meeting recognised that national measures to implement the prohibitions 
in the Convention need to utilize essentially identical language to that of Article I of 
the Convention and also to embrace the extended understandings that have emerged 
from the successive Review Conferences.  The First Meeting recommended that 
States Parties should take effective action by reviewing their national measures to 
ensure that they do indeed prohibit the activities defined in Article I and embrace the 
extended understandings regarding Article I emerging from successive Review 
Conferences. (para 18, 25 and 26) 
 
6.   The First Meeting recognised that national measures to implement the obligations  
of Article III of the Convention need to utilize essentially identical language to that of 
Article III of the Convention and also to embrace the extended understandings that 
have emerged from the successive Review Conferences. These understandings require 
measures that are effective internationally, nationally and subnationally. The First 
Meeting recommended that States Parties should take effective action by reviewing 
their national measures to ensure that they do indeed implement the obligations of 
Article III and embrace the extended understandings regarding Article III emerging 
from successive Review Conferences. (para 19, 25, 26 and 35) 
 
7. The First Meeting noted that some States Parties, as requested by the Second 
Review Conference, have provided to the United Nations Department for 
Disarmament Affairs information on the texts of specific legislation enacted or other 
measures taken to assure domestic compliance with the Convention. The First 
Meeting invited these States Parties, and encouraged all States Parties, to provide such 
information and texts in the future both to the United Nations Department for 
Disarmament Affairs and, upon request, to an individual State Party.  In this regard 
the First Meeting welcomed information provided by States Parties in response to the 
confidence-building measure agreed to at the Third Review Conference entitled 
"Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures". In addition, the First 
Meeting encouraged all States Parties to provide any useful information on the 
implementation of such measures. (para 15, 16 and 59) 
 
8.  The First Meeting noted that the need for national legislation implementing the 
prohibitions of the Convention may be covered to a limited extent in some States 
Parties by national legislation implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention as 
weapons containing toxins are prohibited under both Conventions.  The First Meeting 
urged States Parties to review their national implementing legislation for the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and for the Chemical Weapons 
Convention to ensure that the prohibitions in respect of toxins are both all embracing 
and consistent. (para 27) 
 
9.  The First Meeting emphasized that national implementing legislation needs to 
include prohibition of development, production, stockpiling, retention, acquisition and 
use of biological weapons with language that applies to both biological and toxin 
agents and to the weapons, equipment and means of delivery.  It was recommended 
that language used in the national legislation should be identical to or closely similar 
to that in the Convention so as to avoid any loopholes. (para 30) 
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10.  The First Meeting noted that national legislation implementing the obligations of 
the Convention is likely to be complemented by other national legislation addressing 
topics such as anti-terrorism, public, animal and plant health, and hazardous materials.   
The First Meeting recommended that States Parties consider establishing oversight 
committees involving all the different implementing and enforcement agencies 
together with those who are affected by the legislation in government, industry and 
academia in order to review the consistency and continuing adequacy of the current 
legislation and regulations. (para 32) 
 
11.  The First Meeting recognized the importance of ensuring that national measures  
are applicable to all natural persons and furthermore apply to activities carried out not 
only within but also outside the territory of the State Party.   The First Meeting 
recommended that States Parties review their national measures to ensure that they 
apply to all natural persons and that there are no exclusions and also to ensure that 
they are applicable to natural persons anywhere. (para 33 and 58) 
 
12.  The First Meeting recognized the benefits arising from cooperation and 
initiatives, including regional ones, towards the strengthening and implementation of 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention regime.  The First Meeting 
encouraged regional initiatives to ensure that all States Parties within the region have 
effectively implemented the prohibitions of the Convention and have adopted 
measures that are effective in prevention of the activities defined in Article I of the 
Convention. (para 45 and 61) 
 
13.  The First Meeting recognized that effective national implementation of the 
prohibitions of the Convention requires the mounting of an effective and continuing 
campaign to ensure that all those working with biological agents and toxins both now 
and in the future are aware of the prohibitions of the Convention and of the national 
legislative, administrative and other measures to implement these prohibitions. (para 
47 and 60) 
 
14.  The First Meeting noted that the effectiveness of drawing up national measures to 
implement the prohibitions of the Convention can be enhanced through making draft 
national measures available for consultation by seeking proposals for amendment 
from the public in general and the community that will be affected by and implement 
the measures in particular.  Advisory committees including representatives of the 
community that are affected by the measures can enhance the implementation of the 
national measures. (para 49) 
 
15.  The First Meeting recognized that the national measures to implement the 
prohibitions of the Convention need to be enforced effectively, in order to ensure the 
prevention of all the prohibited activities, and recommended that each State Party 
should review the effectiveness of its enforcement of the prohibitions. (para 51) 
 
16.   The First Meeting encouraged the States Parties to explore the possibility of 
negotiating in an appropriate forum, or asking the Sixth Committee of the United 
Nations General Assembly to negotiate, an international convention on the 
criminalisation of biological and chemical weapon activities which would emphasise 
individual criminal responsibility for acts stigmatized as international crimes.  In 
addition, the First Meeting encouraged States Parties to seek the addition of biological 
and toxin weapons to the existing Rome Statute references to chemical weapons as 
 
29 
falling within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.  The First Meeting  
favoured such international legal approaches to the criminalisation of all acts 
prohibited among States Parties as usefully supplementing national implementation 
measures under Article IV of the BTWC by ensuring that any jurisdictional loopholes 
are closed, and that immunity from prosecution for criminal acts involving biological 
and toxin weapons is thereby abolished. (para 54) 
 
63.  The Meeting of Experts in Geneva on 18 to 29 August 2003 needs to grasp the 
opportunity that it has to help make the First Meeting of States Parties on 10 to 14 November 
2003 a success, by providing the First Meeting with a coherent and comprehensive set of 
common understandings and effective action which the First Meeting can approve and readily 
incorporate in its report.  Beyond November, the significance of the report of the First 
Meeting is to add value to the Inter Review Conference process and to set the pattern of the 
meetings scheduled for 2004 and 2005 on the remaining topics identified by the Fifth Review 
Conference.  The process should therefore contribute, within the limits of the agenda topics 
and the mandate for the meetings agreed by the Fifth Review Conference, to the recovery and 
strengthening of the BTWC through a return to the cumulative development of extended 
understandings leading to effective action at the Sixth Review Conference. 
 
 
